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1. INTRODUCTION
Causes and consequences of investments in human capital have been a central
field of research in the last few decades. Several distinct motivations have concurred
to focus the analysis on this issue. Among them, the relevance of human capital ex-
ternalities in growth theory (see, Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), and the subsequent
literature), and the questions posed by the dynamics of the wage premium and,
more generally, by the evolution of income distribution (see, for instance, Heckman
and Krueger (2003), Goldin and Katz (2007), Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) and
their extensive references). The analysis of human capital externalities is still far
from settled from both the empirical and the theoretical viewpoints. Empirically,
it is not obvious that (at the level of subsidies prevailing in most Western coun-
tries) there are significant, positive diﬀerences between social and private returns.2
From a theoretical viewpoint, the precise microeconomic mechanism generating the
externality is not fully understood (see, however, Acemoglu (1996)). A better un-
derstanding of the nature of the externality has policy relevance. This is true even
if one is willing to take for granted that, at least in many countries, there are no sig-
nificant, unexploited, positive externalities, because this is typically obtained with
very high subsidies to education.3
In this paper, we extend the microeconomic analysis of the externalities related
to investments in human capital. We also derive some results on the welfare eﬀects
of diﬀerent policies: fixed tax/subsidies to education, which aﬀect its direct cost,
and tax/subsidies on labor income.4
We consider economies with two key features. First, we adopt the notion of
human capital put forth in Roy (1951): there are distinct markets for (in our set-
up, perfectly non substitutable) skilled and unskilled labor. However, contrary to
what is often assumed in Roy models, once a worker has selected the type of human
capital she wants to acquire, she still has to decide how much eﬀort to invest. The
human capital so acquired translates one-to-one into eﬃciency units of high skill
(low skill, respectively) labor.5 When agents, through schooling, self-select into
diﬀerent labor markets, the eﬀect of public policies on total surplus works via two
diﬀerent channels. The first is the standard one: their impact on the optimal eﬀort
of the agents acquiring a specific skill (we will refer to it as incentive eﬀect). The
second is their impact on the agents’ distribution across markets (following Charlot
and Decreuse (2005), we call it composition eﬀect). The properties of the economy
crucially depend on the interaction of the two eﬀects. In "pure" Roy models (with
self-selection, but no choice of the investment eﬀort) only the composition eﬀect is
at play. In "pure" eﬃciency-units models (without self-selection) only the incentive
eﬀect is at work. Our model allows us to study the interaction between the two
phenomena. The second essential feature of our economy is that investments are
not contractible ex-ante, so that agents must base their investment decisions on
the (conditional) distribution of their payoﬀs. Lack of contractibility generates
2For the U.S.A., a negative conclusion if reached, for instance, by Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and
Todd (1996) and by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). For E.U. countries, the results in De la Fuente
(2003) are also negative. See also Krueger and Lindhal (2000).
3 In 2005, in the OECD average, 85.5% of the direct cost of education (all levels included) is
financed by public sources (see OECD (2008, Table B3.1, p.251)). The EU19 average is 90.5%.
At the tertiary level, the percentages are, respectively, 73.1% and 82.5% (Table B3.2b, p. 253).
4 In both cases, we introduce uniform lump-sum taxes/subsidies on workers, so that the public
budget is balanced.
5As usual, we can also interpret eﬀort as elastic supply of labor of a given skill.
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constrained ineﬃciency of the market equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium total surplus
is lower than its constrained eﬃcient level.
There are (at least) two classes of economies with these properties. The first is
based on a two-sector version of the economy considered in Acemoglu (1996). In his
model, firms and workers choose the amount of their investments. Then, they are
matched randomly, production takes place, and income distribution is determined
by a bargaining process. In our version, there are two separate sectors. In the first
one, firms use capital and skilled labor. In the second, capital and unskilled labor.
Firms and workers first choose the sector they will be active in. Afterward, each
sector is just an Acemoglu’s economy (so that agents choose their optimal amount
of investments). A second class of economies is characterized by a continuum of
separate islands. On each island there is a continuum of workers and firms. They
choose simultaneously the sector they are going to be active in, and the amount of
their investments. While all the firms are identical ex-ante, workers are identical
in each island, but heterogeneous across them. The source of heterogeneity is a
parameter aﬀecting individual investments in human capital. Its realization on
each island is private information of the workers. After investments take place,
competitive labor markets open, wages are determined at their competitive market
clearing values, and production takes place. In this set-up, investments are not
contractible ex-ante and, when they are made, firms and workers base their actions
on the conditional distribution of wages and producers’ surpluses. In Appendix
2, we show that the closed form of the rational expectation equilibrium of this
economy is, essentially, identical to the one obtained for the previous model.6 In
the paper, we consider the first class of economies to allow for a direct comparison
with the results on the one-sector model, reported in Acemoglu (1996).
We adopt the Roy model of human capital. Most of the recent literature
takes a diﬀerent viewpoint, following the eﬃciency units approach (stemming from
Griliches (1970)). This rules out, by assumption, all the consequences of self-
selection, which appear, instead, to be relevant from both the theoretical and the
empirical viewpoints.7
Acemoglu (1996) studies the microeconomic foundations of externalities in hu-
man capital accumulation in an eﬃciency units model. Some of his results are
robust to our extension to a two-sector economy. For instance: in both cases, the
externality is related to the average level of (sector-specific) human capital, not to
its aggregate level (as postulated in Lucas (1988)). With respect to policy prescrip-
tions, however, the diﬀerences are sharp: in the one-sector model, subsidies to labor
income (or to investments in human capital) are unambiguously beneficial. Only
the incentive eﬀect is at play: a subsidy to the investments in human capital of any
subset of agents increases, as a first order eﬀect, their investments and, therefore,
6There are diﬀerences with respect of the exact nature of constrained ineﬃciency. They change
the details of the analysis, but not the central message. In fact, the equivalent of Proposition 4
always holds, without any rectriction on the set of parameters.
7A survey supporting this claim is in Sattinger (1993). For more recent discussions of the
diﬀerent empirical implications of eﬃciency units vs. Roy models see, for instance, Carneiro,
Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001). They conclude (p.32) that "The data suggest that comparative
advantage is an empirically important phenomenon governing schooling choices and that naive
eﬃciency units models of the labor market are empirically inappropriate". Investments in human
capital in a two-sector economy with frictions due to random matching have been studied in
Sattinger (2003), Charlot and Decreuse (2005), and Mendolicchio, Paolini, and Pietra (2008).
The composition eﬀect plays an essential role in their results. However, they consider economies
with perfectly inelastic supply of human and physical capital, so that the incentive eﬀects of public
policies are absent.
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the expected human capital. This has a positive impact on the firms’ investment
decisions. In turn, this increases the optimal investment of all the workers, so that
these subsidies are always Pareto improving. To reformulate the point diﬀerently:
in one-sector economies, there is a unique (pecuniary) positive externality related
to the level of the investments. Any policy increasing the investments of any subset
of agents is Pareto improving. In a two-sector economy, the incentive eﬀect of a
policy can be strengthened, or weakened, by its composition eﬀect. Specifically,
in the final section of the paper, we consider (balanced budget) policies based on
tax/subsidies to the direct costs of education, and on skill-contingent subsidies to
labor income. If total factor productivities are suﬃciently diverse across sectors,
subsidies to low skilled labor income always increase total surplus, because their
positive eﬀect on individual eﬀort in this sector is strengthened by the composition
eﬀect, i.e., by the "improvement of the expected quality" of the pool of workers in
both markets. An increase in taxes on the direct costs of education, also increases
total surplus, because of its composition eﬀect. On the other hand, subsidies to
high skill labor incomes have a positive incentive eﬀect for these workers, but a neg-
ative composition eﬀect. To reformulate the point, in two-sector economies there
are two distinct pecuniary externalities at play. The one related to the investments
in the low-skill sector is always positive for all the agents in the economy. To the
contrary, the one related to the investments in the high-skill sector is always neg-
ative for low-skilled workers (and firms active in that sector), it may be positive
or negative for agents active in the high-skill sector. We provide a robust example
where its eﬀect on total surplus is negative.
We consider a simple parametric class of economies, with Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions and quasi-linear utility functions. This allows us to compute
explicitly the equilibrium, and the welfare eﬀect of the policies. Because of quasi-
linearity of preferences, our analysis abstracts from any substantive consideration
of distributional issues, and we focus only on eﬃciency issues. Quasi-linearity also
implies that the lump-sum taxes used to balance the government budget have no
incentive eﬀect. Moreover, acquisition of human capital is deterministic and in-
stantaneous, so that there are no opportunity costs of education. An extension of
the analysis to a richer environment is possible, but at an high cost in terms of
analytical tractability. What matters most, the basic intuition behind the welfare
results is strong, and they should be robust (maybe, in a less sharp form) to many
possible extensions of the basic set-up.
We take as benchmark an economy with no subsidies to the direct costs of
education and no income taxes. We would obtain exactly the same results taking
as a benchmark a (more descriptively realistic) economy where there are subsidies
on the direct costs of education and a flat tax on labor income. The obvious
reinterpretation of our result would be in term of lower direct subsidies and some
(small) degree of progressiveness in the tax schedule. We focus the analysis on
income subsidies for three reasons: they deliver analytically tractable, closed form,
values of the equilibrium variables. With the (obvious) reinterpretation provided
above, they are a feature of real world economies. Moreover, the eﬀect of labor
income taxes on investment in human capital has been extensively analyzed in
the literature, and, therefore, our results can be easily compared with previous
work in this field. Finally, analytically identical results can be obtained considering
(properly specified) direct subsidies to the eﬀort in education.8
8Alas, to obtain exactly the same closed form of the equilibrium variables, subsidies must take
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There is a very large literature on the eﬀects of subsidies to education and
of labor income taxes on accumulation of human capital. The usual arguments
favoring subsidies hinge either on their positive externality eﬀects or on the existence
of liquidity constraints. While these second phenomenon is in principle important,
we (deliberately) abstract from it. The classical analysis of the eﬀects of labor
income tax on investments in human capital started with the seminal papers by Ben-
Porath (1970), Boskin (1975) and Heckman (1976).9 A flat labor income tax has a
negative impact on human capital accumulation just because of non-deductibility
of the direct costs of education. On the other hand, by depressing the net interest
rate, in fully specified life-cycle models of consumer behavior, a tax on total income
may actually have a positive eﬀect. Eaton and Rosen (1980) extend the analysis to
(uninsurable) multiplicative wage uncertainty, pointing out that a flat earning tax
aﬀects investments in human capital through its eﬀects on their riskiness and (via
an income eﬀect) on the attitude toward risk. The canonical conclusion regarding
progressive income taxes (compared with a revenue neutral flat rate) is that they
discourage investments at the high skill level, while they may encourage it by the
less skilled. More recent theoretical contributions include Anderberg and Andersson
(2003), Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Jacobs (2003, 2007), Jacobs and Bovenberg
(2008), Jacobs, Schindler and Yang (2009) (see, also, Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998, 1999)). However, in all these papers, there is no self-selection into diﬀerent
skills, so that the key mechanism at work in our economy is absent. Also, notice
that, in our set-up, at the equilibrium, workers face no uncertainty, so that the
mechanism pointed out in Eaton and Rosen (1980) is absent.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the general fea-
tures of the model. Section 3 and 4 discuss equilibria in the benchmark, Walrasian,
economy, and in the economy with imperfect labor markets. Section 5 studies the
properties in terms of welfare of the equilibria of the economy with frictions. Most
of the details are in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, we sketch the analysis of the
"island" model outlined above.
2. THE MODEL
The economy is composed by two separate production sectors, denoted by s ∈
{ne, e} .Workers (denoted by a subscript i when we refer to individuals, I when we
refer to the set) and firms (denoted by j and J, respectively) can choose to enter
one of the two sectors, paying a fixed cost. Workers’ costs, (cneI , c
e
I) , are exogenous,
and can be interpreted as private, fixed costs of education (tuitions and the like).
We denote firms’ costs (dneJ , d
e
J) . They are endogenously determined, and will be
discussed later on.
There are two intervals of equal length of workers, ΩI = (0, 1) , and firms, ΩJ ,
both endowed with the Lebesgue measure. Let ν(ΩsI) (ν(Ω
s
J)) denote the measure of
the set ΩsI (Ω
s
J , respectively). At equilibrium, each interval is partitioned into two
sets, {ΩneI ,ΩeI} and {ΩneJ ,ΩeJ} , determined endogenously. In sector s, production
requires a firm j (with physical capital ksj ) and a worker i (with stock of human cap-
on a specific (and non particularly appealing) functional form (see note 13 below). Moreover,
incentives of this kind beg the problem of direct observability of individual eﬀort.
9As mentioned above, in our set-up, one obtains substantially identical results considering
direct (non-linear) subsidies to eﬀort and subsidies to the direct costs of education. Previous,
related work includes Blankenau (2005), Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009), Caucutt and Kumar
(2003), Lloyd-Ellis (2000), Sahin (2004), and Su (2004).
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ital hsi ). Once the partitions Ω
P
I ≡ {ΩneI ,ΩeI} and ΩPJ ≡ {ΩneJ ,ΩeJ} are given, each
sector of the economy reduces to the set-up studied in Acemoglu (1996). Firms
are identical, and choose their investments in physical capital to maximize their
expected profits. Workers choose their investments in human capital to maximize
their expected utilities.
The economy lasts one period, divided into several subperiods. We consider two
versions of the basic model. In the frictionless (or Walrasian) version, in subperiod
zero, firms and workers enter (paying a fixed cost) one of the two sectors. In
subperiod 1, each firm active in sector s is matched with a worker active in the
same sector (we will be more precise on the matching issue later on). Firms and
workers can sign binding contracts on the amount of human and physical capital
that they will supply. In subperiod 2, investments are carried out. In the final
subperiod, exchanges and production take place, and agents are paid on the basis
of their marginal product.
In the second version of the model, the one with frictions, the total output
of each match is split according to the Nash bargaining solution with (exogenous)
weights β and (1− β) (for a rationalization of this allocation rule in this context, see
the Appendix in Acemoglu (1996)). Moreover, and most important, agents cannot
contract with their partner a given level of investment, because they are carried out
before matches take place. To summarize: in subperiod 0, agents choose to enter
one of the two sectors, paying a fixed entry cost. In subperiod 1, they choose their
levels of investment. In subperiod 2, they are randomly matched and then, finally,
production and exchanges take place.
When workers are heterogeneous, the friction in the labor market, due to the
determination of labor income through bargaining, has a very limited role in de-
termining the eﬃciency properties of equilibria. The crucial feature is that agents
choose their investments, considering the conditional distribution of the investments
of a (non trivial) set of potential future partners. Indeed, as long as investments are
non-contractible, the same qualitative results hold, even if the spot labor markets
are perfectly competitive10 (see Appendix 2).
Technologies are described by a pair of Cobb-Douglas production functions with
constant returns to scale. Therefore, in the Walrasian set-up, equilibrium profits are
zero, entry costs dj are zero for each s, and each firm is indiﬀerent among sectors.
Thus, the equilibrium partition is essentially determined by the labor supply side
of the model. On the contrary, in the economy with frictions, expected producers’
surpluses are positive in both sectors and, as we will show later on, larger in sector
e. To avoid additional complications (not really germane to our main issue), we
want to consider an economy with full employment at equilibrium. This requires
that, at equilibrium, each agent is actually matched with a partner. We assume,
as in Acemoglu (1996), that the matching function guarantees with probability one
a match to each agent, provided that ν (ΩsI) = ν (Ω
s
J) . A commonly used function
which delivers this property is πsj =
min{ν(ΩsI),ν(ΩsJ)}
ν(ΩsJ)
(and πsi = π
s
j
ν(ΩsJ)
ν(ΩsI)
), where
πsj is the probability of a match for a firm active in sector s. The partition Ω
P
I
is determined endogenously. To guarantee full employment, we need that, at each
equilibrium, ν (ΩsI) = ν (Ω
s
J). The easiest way to obtain this property is to introduce
a feature of the economy such that equilibrium expected profits are always equal in
10 In Acemoglu (1996), the benchmark is an economy with identical workers and firms. Evidently,
in this case, if spot labor markets were competitive, we would end up with the Pareto eﬃcient,
complete markets allocation.
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the two sectors.11 One way to obtain this is to assume that the technology exploited
in sector ne is free, while the one adopted in sector e is protected by a patent,
owned by some outside agent (clearly, nothing would change if each technology
were subject to a distinct patent).12 Rights to use the patent are auctioned oﬀ to
firms before the match firm-worker obtains. Given that, at an equilibrium, expected
profits in both sectors must be identical, the equilibrium royalties must be equal
to the (positive) diﬀerence between the expected producer’s surpluses in the two
sectors. Then, at each equilibrium, each firm is indiﬀerent among sectors, so that
we can choose ΩPJ with ν (Ω
s
I) = ν (Ω
s
J). The property we are looking for.
Without any loss of generality, we can take the prices of both kinds of output
to be equal to 1 and, therefore, omit them.
Finally, notice that there are always three additional equilibria: the ones where
all workers and firms are in one of the two sectors, and the one where none is active
in any sector. As usual, we will ignore these trivial equilibria.
3. THE FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY
When active in sector s, and matched with worker i with human capital hsi ,
firm j has production function
ysij = A
shsαi k
s(1−α)
j ,
with Ae > Ane. Let µ be the unit price of physical capital, that we assume to be
equal in the two sectors. This implies some loss of generality, but allows for more
straightforward computations. Similar results could be obtained for µe 6= µne.
If active in sector s, and given a match with worker i, firm j solves optimization
problem
choose ksj ∈ argmaxAshsαi k
s(1−α)
j − µksj − wsijhsi , (ΠWs)
where we omit the royalties, because, at equilibrium, they must be zero.
For each worker active in sector s, the utility function is
Usi (C
s
i , h
s
i ) = C
s
i −
1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
,
where Csi denotes consumption, h
s
i is the amount of human capital (or the labor
supply). Let csI be the (fixed) cost of the investment in sector s human capital.
Then, in the absence of taxes and subsidies, if worker i is active in sector s and
matched with firm j, Csi =
¡
wsijh
s
i − csI
¢
. Workers are heterogeneous because of
the parameter δi. Without any essential loss of generality, we assume that δi =
i, and that δi is uniformly distributed on (0, 1) . More general assumptions on
the distribution of δi, or its support, would introduce additional computational
complexities without changing any essential result. Given that, in the sequel, we will
introduce uniform lump sum taxes, we must (alternatively, and equivalently) either
11An alternative solution is to assume that firms cannot move across sectors. A non-null measure
of firms is exogenously assigned to each sector. We then pick a matching function which always
guarantees that each firm is matched with a worker (and conversely) for each non-trivial partition
of the workers. As long as there is a continuum of agents in each sector, this can be done. Of
course, this approach would break down if we had a finite number of agents and, anyhow, is based
on a very ad hoc trick.
12Any input used only in sector e and with perfectly inelastic supply would do. We consider
the case of a patent to simplify as much as possible the model.
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allow for negative consumption, or assume that workers have a strictly positive (and
suﬃciently large) initial endowment of consumption good. Given the properties of
the utility functions, the most convenient solution (purely notation-wise) is the first
one.
By a straightforward computation, the equilibrium amount of agent i’s invest-
ment in human capital in sector s is given by
HWs (δi) ≡
"
δiαA
s 1α
µ
1− α
µ
¶ 1−α
α
# 1
Γ
,
where the superscript W denotes the frictionless, Walrasian economy. Given that,
at the equilibrium, profits are always zero and firms are identical, there is no loss
of generality in assuming that firm j is always matched with worker i = j. With
this convention, the (equilibrium) demand for physical capital of firm j = i is
KWs(δi) ≡
"
δiαAs
1+Γ
α
µ
1− α
µ
¶ 1−α+Γ
α
# 1
Γ
.
Let’s now consider the equilibrium partition ΩPI . For convenience (and without
any loss of generality), set cneI = 0 and c
e
I > 0. Let
VWsi (δi, c
s
I) ≡ Usi
¡
HWs (δi) ,KWs (δi) , csI
¢
,
be the level of utility of agent i active in sector s, evaluated at the equilibrium
Worker i chooses to enter sector e if and only if
VWei (δi, c
e
I)− VWnei (δi) ≥ 0,
i.e., by direct computation, if and only if
δi ≥ δW ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1+Γ
Γ c
e
I"
α
³
1−α
µ
´ (1−α)
α
# 1+Γ
Γ h
Ae
1+Γ
αΓ −Ane 1+ΓαΓ
i
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Γ
. (1)
Hence, for ceI positive and suﬃciently small, there is a unique threshold value
δW , strictly increasing in ceI .
Clearly, the physical-human capital ratio is δi-invariant, with
KWs(δi)
HWs(δi)
=
³
(1−α)As
µ
´ 1
α
and K
We(δi)
HWe(δi)
> K
Wne(δi)
HWne(δi)
, each i.
4. THE ECONOMY WITH FRICTIONS
Given any random variable xs, with xs : ΩsI → R, (or ys, with ys : ΩsJ → R),
let
EΩsI (x
s
i ) ≡
R
ΩsI
xsidi
ν (ΩsI)¡
EΩsJ (y
s
j )
¢
be the conditional expectation of xsi over the set Ω
s
I (of y
s
j over Ω
s
J).
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Later on, we will show that, at the equilibrium, it is always ΩeI = [bδ, 1). There-
fore, in the sequel, the partitions ΩPI and Ω
P
J will be defined by the threshold levelbδ. To emphasize this, we will use the notation ΩsJ ³bδ´ and ΩsI ³bδ´ . We denote δF
the equilibrium threshold value. The superscript F indicates equilibrium values in
the economy with frictions.
For future reference, let’s determine the optimal amount of investments assum-
ing that there is a public intervention defined by a pair of vectors ξs ≡ (τs, ζs,∆csI , T ) ,
ξ ≡ (ξe, ξne) , describing (possibly) sector specific subsidies and taxes. We assume
that there are linear subsidies on labor income (with rates τ s, s = ne, e), and on
the cost of the investments in physical capital (with rates ζs, s = ne, e) and fixed
taxes on the direct costs of education, ∆csI (we will always set ∆c
ne
I = 0). T denotes
a (uniform) lump-sum tax, such that the public budget is balanced. We write the
subsidy rates as sector specific just to simplify the notation. As we will show, at
the equilibrium, the investment in physical capital is always larger in sector e, and
the labor income of each worker in sector e is always strictly greater than the one
of any worker active in sector ne. Therefore, this subsidy system is (at equilibrium)
isomorphic to a system of step-linear subsidies to labor income (i.e., similar to the
usual system of progressive income taxes) and to investments in physical capital.13
Pick an arbitrary threshold value bδ. If active in sector s, firm j selects the value
of ksj solving optimization problem
max
ksj
EΩsI(?δ)
³
(1− β)Ashsαi k
s(1−α)
j − µ (1− ζ
s) ksj
´
− dsJ
= (1− β)AsEΩsI(?δ) (h
sα
i ) k
s(1−α)
j − µ (1− ζ
s) ksj − dsJ . (ΠFs)
Let EΩsI(?δ)
¡
ΠFs (.)
¢
be the expected surplus (inclusive of dsJ) in sector s. As men-
tioned before, we interpret dsJ as royalties paid to access the technologies used in
the two sectors. We set dneJ = 0 and, at equilibrium, d
Fe
J is equal to the (positive,
as we will show) diﬀerence between the conditional expected producer’s surpluses
in the two sectors. Therefore, each firm is indiﬀerent between the two sectors and
has non-negative (conditional) expected profits.
The optimization problem of worker i (if s) is
max
hsi
EΩsJ(?δ)
(Usi (.)) (U
Fs)
= (1 + τ s)βAshsαi EΩsJ(?δ)
³
ks(1−α)j
´
− 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
− (csI +∆csI + T ) .
For completeness, let’s make precise our notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1. Given ξ, an equilibrium of the economy with frictions is a thresh-
old value δF ∈ (0, 1) , a royalty deFJ > 0, and two pairs of maps
n
HFs
³
δi, δ
F , ξ
´
,KFs(δF , ξ)
o
,
s = ne, e, such that:
i. Uei
³
HFe
³
δi, δ
F , ξ
´
,KFe(δF , ξ)
´
−Unei
³
HFne
³
δi, δ
F , ξ
´
,KFne(δF , ξ)
´
≥ 0
if and only if δi ≥ δF ;
ii.
h
EΩeI(δF )
³
ΠFe
³
δF , ξ
´´
−EΩneI (δF )
³
ΠFne
³
δF , ξ
´´i
= deFJ > 0;
13Exactly the same closed form of the equilibrim is obtained considering a direct subsidy to
eﬀort in education of the form τshsαi , which would require direct observability of eﬀort.
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iii. KFs(δF , ξ) solves
¡
ΠFs
¢
, s = ne for each j = i such that δi < δ
F , s = e for
each j = i such that δi ≥ δF ;
iv. HFs
³
δi, δ
F , ξ
´
solves
¡
UFs
¢
, s = ne for δi < δ
F , and s = e for δi ≥ δF .
In Appendix 1, in eqs. (A3) and (A4), we compute the equilibrium values
of human and physical capital in each sector s, for arbitrarily given threshold bδ,³
HFs
³
δi,bδ, ξ´ ,KFs(bδ, ξ)´ . Let V Fsi ³δi,bδ, ξ´ be the associated level of utility of
agent i, if active in sector s. Worker i enters sector e if and only if
F
³bδ, ξ, ceI´ ≡ V Fei ³δi,bδ, ξ´− V Fnei ³δi,bδ, ξ´ ≥ 0.
The equilibrium threshold value δF is then obtained solving
F
³bδ, ξ, ceI´ ≡ f ³bδ, ξ´− a (ceI +∆ceI) = 0,
where
f
³bδ, ξ´ ≡ bδ α1−α+Γ µAeEΩeI(?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γi ´(1−α)
¶ 1+Γ
αΓ
χe (ξ)− (2)
bδ α1−α+Γ µAneEΩneI (?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γi ´(1−α)
¶ 1+Γ
αΓ
χne (ξ) ,
with χs (ξ) ≡ (1+τ
s)
1
Γ (1+Γ−(1+τs)α)
(1−ζs)
(1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
, and a ≡ 1+Γ
α
1
Γ β
1+Γ
Γ
³
µ
(1−α)(1−β)
´ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
.
Remark 1. Using (A7) in Appendix 1, and given that EΩeI(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´
> EΩneI (?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´
, and Ae > Ane, at each equilibrium,
deFJ =
h
EΩeI(δF )
³
ΠFe
³
δF , ξ
´´
−EΩneI (δF )
³
ΠFne
³
δF , ξ
´´i
> 0,
at ξ = 0, as claimed above.
The following Proposition summarizes the fundamental properties of equilibria.
Proposition 1. Fix (Γ, α, β). Given (Ae, Ane, ξ), there is
∼
C > 0 such that,
for each ceI such that ac
e
I ∈
µ
0,
∼
C
¶
, there is an equilibrium with threshold value
δF ∈ (0, 1) . Moreover, given Ane, there is Ae such that, for each Ae > Ae, at ξ = 0,
the equilibrium is unique and ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂τe < 0,
∂δF (.)
∂τne > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
> 0,
∂δF (.)
∂Ae < 0 and
∂δF (.)
∂Ane > 0.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
In the sequel, we will mostly consider the leading case where ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0 at each
equilibrium threshold.
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Remark 2. Given ξ = 0 and (Ane,Γ, α, β) , for Ae suﬃciently close to Ane the
economy can exhibit multiple equilibria. In Example A1 (in Appendix 1), we
construct an economy with ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0 for
bδ suﬃciently close to 0, and ∂f(.)
∂?δ < 0
for bδ suﬃciently close to 1. Given that ∂f(.)
∂?δ is a continuous function on (0, 1) ,
f(.) has at least one local maximum, δ. Evidently, each economy with ceI such that
aceI < f(δ), and close enough to f(δ), has at least two equilibria.
Remark 3. Let ξ = 0. Consider a sequence of equilibrium thresholds
n
δF (Aev)
ov=∞
v=1
associated with any sequence {Aev}v=∞v=1 with Aev → Ane. If
µ
1−
³
1
γ
´ α
1−α+Γ
¶
>
aceI
(1−α+Γ)Ane , δ
F (Aev) → eδ ∈ (0, 1) . Hence, investments in human capital of type
e at equilibrium may be positive even when this skill is completely useless, from
the technological view point. This result is somehow similar to what happens in
signalling models. However, in this economy there is no asymmetry of information,
and therefore the mechanism behind investments in technically useless skills is dif-
ferent, and it is crucially related to lack of contractibility. It is an open issue how
general is this asymptotic property of the generalized Roy model in non-Walrasian
economies.14
Remark 4. Fix ξ = 0. Modulo a redistribution of output, the Walrasian allo-
cation is the unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation of this economy (i.e., δW coincides
with its Pareto optimal level). With elastic supply of human and physical capital,
no allocation rule (i.e., no value of β) can guarantee Pareto eﬃciency of the equilib-
rium allocation, because KFs(bδ) is δi−invariant, while, in the Walrasian economy,
KWs(δi) is correlated with δi.
Remark 5. At ξ = 0, using (A3) and (A4) in Appendix 1, the physical/human
capital ratio is given by
KFs(δF )
HFs
³
δi, δ
F
´ = KWs (δi)
HWs (δi)
⎡
⎢⎣
(1− β)
1
α EΩsI(δF )
³
δ
a
1−α+Γ
i
´ 1
α
δ
1
1−α+Γ
i
⎤
⎥⎦ .
In sector ne, and for suﬃciently small δi, the term in square brackets is always
greater than one, so that K
Fne(δF )
HFne(δi,δF )
> K
Wne(δi)
HWne(δi)
, for δi small enough. This imme-
diately implies that agents with a suﬃciently low δi are always better oﬀ at the
equilibrium of the frictional economy. Hence, the Walrasian equilibrium allocation
is not Pareto superior to the one of the economy with frictions. Of course, it still
dominates it in terms of total surplus.15
Remark 6. The threshold value δF can be either lower or higher than its value
in the Walrasian economy, as we establish with the following example.
Example 1. Let ξ = 0. Consider the economy with Ae = 2, Ane = 1, α = β =
1/2, and Γ = 1. By direct computation, using (1) and (2), δF and δW are obtained
14Clearly, this result could partly depend upon the specific features of our model, i.e., existence
of two separate sectors, and perfect lack of substitutability between human capitals of diﬀerent
skills.
15Given the structure of preferences, if total surplus in the economy with frictions were larger
than the one of the Walrasian economy, we would contraddict the first fundamental theorem of
welfare economics.
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solving
0 =
27
8192
⎛
⎝ 3
pbδÃ41− bδ
1− bδ
!2
− bδ
⎞
⎠− ceI ≡ fF
³bδ´− ceI
in the economy with frictions, and
0 =
15
32
bδ − ceI ≡ fW ³bδ´− ceI
in the Walrasian economy. They are shown in Figure 1 (fW
³bδ´ is described by the
solid line). One can verify that, for ceI < 0.019, δ
F < δW , while, for ceI > 0.019, the
opposite occurs.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE
Our main purpose is to analyze the policy implications of self-selection into
distinct labor markets. Anyhow, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the
comparative statics of equilibria. Let φ ≡ (ξ,Ae, Ane) . Let ws
³
δi, δ
F , φ
´
be
worker i’s wage in sector s. The standard deviation, σ
ΩsI(δ
F )
³
δF , φ
´
, measures
the variability of wages within sector s. WP
ΩeI(δ
F )
³
δF , φ
´
is the wage premium.
In general, there are three diﬀerent notions of wage premium: the marginal ratio
we(δF ,δF ,φ)
wne(δF ,δF ,φ)
, EΩeI(δF )
µ
we(δi,δF ,φ)
wne(δi,δF ,φ)
¶
(the average over the agents who actually
invested) and EΩneI (δF )
µ
we(δi,δF ,φ)
wne(δi,δF ,φ)
¶
(the average over the ones who actually
did not invest). The wage function is multiplicative in δi. Hence, the three values
coincide, so that we can unambiguously talk of "wage premium".
Proposition 2. Fix (Γ, ceI , α, β). Assume that
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0. At ξ = 0, the
following sign restrictions are satisfied:16
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dτe dτne ∆ceI dA
e dAne
EΩeI(δF )
¡
HFe(.)
¢
? + + ? +
EΩneI (δF )
¡
HFne(.)
¢
− + + − +
EΩeI(δF )
(we(.)) ? + + ? +
EΩneI (δF )
(wne(.)) − + + − +
σΩneI (δF )
(.) − + + − +
WPΩeI(δF )
(.) + − − + −
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
The mechanism explaining these results is based on the interaction of incentive
and composition eﬀect. For instance, consider the eﬀect of a change in the para-
meter Ane. Its increase stimulates eﬀort in education of low-skilled workers, and
pushes up the threshold δF . Via the composition eﬀect, it improves the (condi-
tional) expected human capital of both low and high skilled workers. This, in turn,
16Each cell reports the sign of the derivative of the function on the row with respect to the
variable on the column.
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stimulates investments in physical capital. The positive feed-backs strengthen these
initial impacts. Hence, the eﬀect on expected human capital and wages in both sec-
tors are positive. For the wage premium, both direct and composition eﬀects are
negative. The standard deviation of wages of unskilled workers increases because
both eﬀects are positive.
In the table, we omit the standard deviation of the wages of skilled workers. For
this variable, the sign of the composition eﬀect varies over the parameter space, so
that it is impossible to reach any well-defined result.17
5. EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF THE ECONOMY WITH FRICTIONS
In Remark 4, we have seen that the equilibria of the economy with frictions
are Pareto ineﬃcient. We will now show that they do not satisfy either a weaker
criterion of constrained optimality (CO in the sequel) which takes into account the
imperfections which characterize the economy. Most interesting is the analysis of
their ineﬃciency in terms of amount, and type, of investments. In the sequel, we
will mainly refer to the investments in human capital. Similar considerations hold
for the ones in physical capital.
In our set-up, ineﬃciencies can be of two diﬀerent types. First, an individual
can choose an amount of investment diﬀerent from the CO one, given the partition
ΩPI associated with the CO allocation. We will refer to this possible source of
ineﬃciency as underinvestment (or overinvestment) in educational eﬀort. Secondly,
an agent can choose to invest in a type of education diﬀerent from the one assigned to
her at the CO allocation. We will say that there is underinvestment in educational
level when agent i invests in education ne, while, at the CO allocation, she should
invest in education level e.
In the one-sector model, equilibria are unambiguously characterized by under-
investment. In our set up, the same eﬀect is at work: in each sector, given δF (or
any arbitrary bδ), an increase in the investments of firms and workers leads to a
Pareto improvement. The argument is identical to the one exploited by Acemoglu
(1996): fix δF and consider a small change in hsi and k
s
j , each i and j. The changes
in utilities and producers’ surplus evaluated at the equilibrium pair (hFsi , k
Fs
j ) (and
taking into account that kFsj = k
Fs, each j and s) are given by
0 <
Ã
αβAs
∙
kFs
hFsi
¸1−α
− 1
δi
hFsΓi
!
dh+
µ
(1− α)βAs
µ
hFsi
kFs
¶α¶
dk, (3)
and
0 <
Ã
(1− α) (1− β)As
EΩsI(δF )
¡
hFsαi
¢
kFsα
− µ
!
dk
+
⎛
⎝α (1− β)As k
Fs(1−α)
EΩsI(δF )
³
hFs(1−α)i
´
⎞
⎠ dh, (4)
17For reasonable values of the parameters, α = 2
3
and Γ > 1
2
, some numerical simulations show
that the composition eﬀect has the sign opposite to the one of ∂δ
F
∂φ . Therefore,
∂σe(.)
∂φ is positive
for φ0 ∈ {τe, Ae} , negative for φ0 ∈ ?τne,∆ceI , Ae
?
.
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respectively. The inequalities hold because the first terms in parenthesis in (3) and
(4) are zero (at the optimal solutions of
¡
ΠFs
¢
and (UFs)), while the second terms
are positive. Hence, given any bδ, there is underinvestment in educational eﬀort and
physical capital, in each sector. This establishes, in a more direct way, the Pareto
ineﬃciency of equilibria in the economy with frictions.
In the two-sector case, there is a second potential source of ineﬃciency, because
changes in the value of bδ may also entail Pareto improvements. An increase in the
threshold value bδ increases the conditional expected amount of human capital in
both sectors at the same time and, consequently, induces an increase in the amount
of physical investments of firms in both sectors. Indeed, given that δ
α
1−α+Γ
i is strictly
monotonically increasing,
∂EΩsI(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´
∂bδ > 0, for each s and bδ, (5)
and, consequently, using (A3) and (A4),
∂HFs
³
δi,bδ, ξ´
∂bδ |ξ=0 > 0 and
∂KFs
³bδ, ξ´
∂bδ |ξ=0 > 0, for each s and bδ. (6)
More relevant, from (A5), (A6) and (5), for each i and bδ,
∂V Fsi
³
δi,bδ, ξ´
∂bδ |ξ=0 > 0 and
∂EΩsI(?δ)
³
ΠFs
³
δi,bδ, ξ´´
∂bδ |ξ=0 > 0, (7)
where EΩsI(?δ)
³
ΠFs
³
δi,bδ, ξ´´ is the (ex-post) surplus of the firm matched with
worker i in sector s.
These properties do not suﬃce to establish our claim, because a change in the
threshold induces a jump in the producer’s surplus for the firms shifting from one
sector to the other. However, as we will formally establish below (in Proposition 4),
under suitable restrictions on equilibria, suﬃciently small increases of the threshold
value increase aggregate surplus.
To complete the analysis of the welfare properties of equilibria, it is convenient
to introduce an explicit notion of (constrained) eﬃciency. As usual in economies
with frictions, we consider the metaphor of a benevolent planner choosing an al-
location while facing constraints aiming to capture the ones the agents face in the
decentralized economy. We provide two results. First, we show that there are con-
strained optimal allocations (Proposition 3), and that they can be attained with
an appropriate system of taxes and subsidies. The amount of subsidies and taxes
is entirely dictated by the features of the CO allocation, and they can be (in fact,
are) quite large. That’s why, in Proposition 4, we study the eﬀects of small taxes
and subsidies on total surplus evaluated at the market equilibrium, taking as given
the actual demand and supply functions of the agents.
Bear in mind that, in the sequel, we always consider changes in total surplus.
We are not concerned with actual Pareto improvements. However, given that utility
functions are quasi-linear, an increase of total surplus immediately translates (mod-
ulo an appropriate - and i−contingent - system of lump-sum taxes and transfers)
into a Pareto improvement. Also, given the structure of the economy, the systems
of taxes and transfers can be designed so to guarantee a balanced budget.
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5.1. Constrained optimal allocations
The objective function of the planner is given by the sum of expected utilities
and producers’ surpluses of the agents, i.e.,
P
¡
hsi , k
s
j ,Ω
s
I ,Ω
s
J
¢
≡
X
s
Z
ΩsI(?δ)
"
βEΩsJ(?δ)
³
Ashsαi k
s(1−α)
j
´
− 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
− csI
#
di
+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(?δ)
h
(1− β)EΩsI(?δ)
³
Ashsαi k
s(1−α)
j
´
− µksj
i
dj.
The policy instruments are the partitions ΩPI and Ω
P
J and a pair of maps
(HCOs
³
δi,bδ´ , KCOs ³bδ´).We restrict the partitions to have the structure ΩeI ³bδ´ =n
i ∈ ΩI |δi ≥ bδo , and ΩeJ ³bδ´ = nj ∈ ΩJ |j = i, i ∈ ΩeI ³bδ´o . Given that firms are
(ex-ante) identical, the informational constraints embedded into the definition of
P (.) , and the properties of the (implicit) matching function, to impose this struc-
ture on ΩPJ does not entail any loss of generality. Also, observe that, given that
firms are identical, expected total surplus and realized total surplus coincide.
Proposition 3. Under the maintained assumptions, each economy with fric-
tions has a CO allocation. Equilibrium allocations are never CO, and they are
characterized by underinvestment in the amount of physical capital and in educa-
tional eﬀort. Both under and overinvestment in educational level are possible.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
The source of ineﬃciency considered by Acemoglu (1996) reappears in our set-
up, because, given any threshold level bδ, HCOs ³δi,bδ´ > HFs ³δi,bδ´ , for each δi,
and KCOs
³bδ´ > KFs ³bδ´. On the other hand, the relation between the CO value
of the threshold, δCO, and its equilibrium level, δF , is not univocal. Example A2,
in Appendix 1, shows an economy such that, for ceI suﬃciently small δ
F < δCO,
while the opposite occurs for ceI suﬃciently large.
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Remark 7. In our set-up (as well as in Acemoglu (1996)), equilibria of the econ-
omy with frictions are constrained ineﬃcient for each value of β, because, at ξ = 0,
even if δCO = δF ,
HFs
³
δi, δ
CO
´
HCOs
³
δi, δ
CO
´ = (1− β) 1−ααΓ β 1Γ , for each s and i,
and
KFs
³
δCO
´
KCOs
³
δCO
´ = (1− β) 1−α+ΓαΓ β 1Γ , for each s.
Evidently, both ratios are diﬀerent from 1, for each β ∈ (0, 1) . In the usual random
matching model, eﬃciency obtains when the Hosios’ condition is satisfied, i.e., when
18 In the example, the surplus associated with the market equilibrium is always increasing in the
threshold value, even when 1 > δF > δCO . This is because, in computing the values of δF and
δCO, we use
?
HFs(.),KFs(.)
?
in one case,
?
HCOs(.),KCOs(.)
?
in the other.
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β is equal to the absolute value of the elasticity of the matching function. In our
economy there is always full employment of all the resources, so that no congestion
externality is at work. Therefore, the Hosios’ condition has no connection with
Pareto eﬃciency.19
It is easy to see that the CO distribution of investments in human and physical
capital can be attained with an appropriate system of subsidies to investments in
physical capital and labor income, and of fixed taxes or subsidies on the educational
choice. Moreover, given that preferences are quasi-linear, the system of tax and
subsidies can be balanced using uniform lump-sum taxes (T ) on workers (notice
that, in the absence of positive endowments of consumption goods, this could entail
negative consumption for some subset of agents).
Corollary 1. There is a (balanced budget) system of taxes and subsidies ξ
such that the associated equilibrium allocation is CO.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
5.2. The eﬀect of income taxes and subsidies to education on total
surplus
We conclude considering the welfare eﬀects of alternative, balanced budget, tax
schemes. In particular, we study the eﬀect on total surplus of local changes in the
vector ξ, in a neighborhood of ξ = 0. We just consider the eﬀects of (τ ,∆ceI) .
Assume that ∂F
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0, and that δ
F is not "too high". Then, an increase in the
cost of education (redistributing the revenues as lump-sum transfer), or an increase
of the subsidies to labor income in the "low skill" sector ne (financed with lump-sum
taxes) always has a positive eﬀect on total surplus. On the contrary, an increase in
the subsidy to labor income in the high skill sector (again, financed with lump-sum
taxes) may decrease it. The intuition behind the result is fairly simple. A subsidy
τne > 0 has a direct, positive eﬀect on eﬀort in this sector, and a positive, indirect,
eﬀect on eﬀort in both sectors, because it induces an increase in the equilibrium
value of δF (ξ) . For the same reason, a tax on higher education ∆ceI > 0 has an
indirect, positive eﬀect on eﬀort in both sectors. Therefore, they always lead to an
increase in total surplus. The third policy (τ e > 0) makes sector e more attractive
to workers. Therefore, it induces some workers with δi < δ
F (0) to switch to sector
e. This has an unambiguous, negative eﬀect on the welfare of the workers remaining
in sector ne (and on the expected profits in this sector). The negative eﬀect on
the welfare of the workers in sector e, due to the composition eﬀect, may actually
overcome the positive eﬀect of the incentives in this sector, too. More generally, the
net eﬀect on total surplus is ambiguous, and there are economies where subsidies in
the high skill sector induce a lower total surplus. This is established in Proposition
4 and by a final example.
In showing these results, the main diﬃculty is that a change in the thresh-
old induces a discontinuous jump in the expected producer’s surplus for the firms
changing sectors. We provide one suﬃcient condition which guarantees that, at
the equilibrium, the total surplus is increasing in the value of the threshold. This
condition is far from necessary for our results. Given (α, β,Γ) , the threshold value
δF must be below some upper limit δ. Hence, this is essentially a restriction on the
19As observed in Acemoglu (1996, p. 789), given any threshold ?δ, the externalities are related
to "the value of the future matches and are always positive".
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ratio A
e
Ane . The implicit restriction on the equilibrium threshold is not unreasonable.
For instance, for α = 23 , we certainly have
∂P (?δ,ξ)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0 if δ
F < 0.6 and Γ = 0.2,
if δF < 0.35 and Γ = 0.5 and so on. The critical value δ is decreasing in α and Γ.20
Up to now we have consider a sector-contingent vector of subsidy rates (τ e, τne) .
This is certainly an unusual feature. However, the same results can be obtained
with a standard system of step-linear subsidies, of the type
T (w) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
τnew if w ≤ wne
³
δF , δF
´
τnewne
³
δF , δF
´
+ τe
³
w − wne
³
δF , δF
´´
if w > wne
³
δF , δF
´ ,
where w denotes a generic labor income, while ws
³
δF , δF
´
is the labor income, in
sector s, of the worker with δi = δ
F at the equilibrium associated with the threshold
level δF . All that is required to establish this result is to observe that, at ξ = 0,
at the equilibrium associated with any δF the actual labor income of each worker
in sector e is larger than the labor income of any worker in sector ne. Indeed, by
direct computation, the labor income of worker i active in sector s is given by
βY s(δi, δ
F ) =
⎡
⎣β
µ
(1− α) (1− β)
µ
¶ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
(αβ)
1
Γ
⎤
⎦ (8)
×As 1+ΓαΓ EΩsI(δF )
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i ,
and, evidently, βY e(δ0i, δ
F ) > βY ne(δ”i , δ
F ) for each δ0i ≥ δF ≥ δ”i .
Remark 8. We are taking as a reference point an economy where ξ = 0. Evi-
dently, if we introduce a flat tax rate t on labor incomes, we would obtain exactly
the same results changing the marginal tax rates.
To conclude, let’s make formal the heuristic argument above. Given ξ, workers
and firms choose their individually optimal behavior. Let S (ξ) be the expected
total surplus corresponding to the equilibrium associated with the vector ξ of policy
instruments. Let δF (ξ) be the equilibrium threshold associated with the vector ξ.
Then
S (ξ) ≡
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δF (ξ))
EΩsI(δF (ξ))
³
ΠFsj
³
δi, δ
F (ξ) , ξ
´´
dj (9)
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δF (ξ))
V Fsi
³
δi, δ
F (ξ) , ξ
´
di,
with total lump-sum taxes given by
T (ξ) =
"X
s
τ s
Z
ΩsI(δF (ξ))
ws(δi, δ
F (ξ) , ξ)di−∆ceIν
³
ΩeI
³
δF (ξ)
´´#
,
so that the budget is balanced.
20An alternative suﬃcient condition is that β is "large enough". Notice that, for the class of
economies considered in Appendix 2, it is always ∂P (δ
∗,ξ)
∂δ∗ |δ∗=δF > 0. Here, we need additional
restrictions because of discontinuity in expected producer’s surplus.
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Proposition 4. Consider an equilibrium associated with ξ = 0 and such that
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (0) > 0 and
1− δF (0)
1+Γ
1−α+Γ³
1− δF (0)
´
δF (0)
α
1−α+Γ
≥ 1
1− α.
Then,
i. ∆ceI > 0, and suﬃciently small, increases total surplus,
ii. τne > 0, and suﬃciently small, increases total surplus,
iii. τ e > 0, and suﬃciently small, may decrease total surplus.
The proofs of (i, ii) are in Appendix 1, where we also establish that the welfare
eﬀect of a subsidy τe is, in general, indeterminate. We now provide a strategy
to construct economies where an increase in τe decreases total surplus. The third
statement, therefore, is established by the following example.
EXAMPLE 3. Welfare-reducing subsidies to investments in human capital
in the high skill sector.
From eq. (2), the sign of ∂f
∂?δ |?δ=δF (.) depends upon the parameters
¡
Ae
Ane , α,Γ
¢
,
and the equilibrium level δF (.) , while it doesn’t depend directly on β. Moreover,
given
¡
Ae
Ane , α,Γ
¢
, the eﬀect of changes of β on the value of δF (.) can always be
neutralized by appropriate changes in the parameter ceI .
Clearly,
∂S(.)
∂τ e
=
µ
∂S(.)
∂δF
¶
∂δF (ξ)
∂τe
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δF (.))
∂V Fs(δi, δ
F , ξ)
∂τs
di
+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δF (ξ))
∂EΩsI(δF (ξ))
³
ΠFs
³
δF , ξ
´´
∂τs
dj
We want to construct an economy such that, at the equilibrium, ∂S(.)∂τe < 0. The
last four terms of ∂S(.)∂τe are positive, and they are easily seen to be bounded above
(looking at their parametric structure in (A5) and (A7)) . Hence, the required
result is established if we can construct an equilibrium with
³
∂S(.)
∂δF
´
∂δF (ξ)
∂τe < 0 and
arbitrarily large in absolute value. As established in Example A1 in Appendix 1,
for A
e
Ane suﬃciently small, there are economies such that
∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0, for
bδ suﬃciently
small and ∂f(.)
∂?δ < 0 for
bδ large enough. Given that the function ∂f(.)
∂?δ is continuous,
this implies that, for economies in this set, there is δ such that ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δ = 0 and
∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0 at each
bδ < δ. Given the values of all the parameters, but the actual
direct cost of education, ceI , pick a sequence {cevI }∞v=1 such that cevI < ceI = f(δ),
for each v, and cevI → ceI . Along this sequence, by construction, δ
F (cevI ) < δ, and
δF (cevI )→ δ. Therefore,
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (cevI ) > 0, for each v, and limv→∞
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (cevI ) = 0.
By the implicit function theorem, ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe = −
∂f(.)
∂τe
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF
. Given that ∂f(.)∂τe is positive
and bounded away from zero (see Proposition 1), the sequence ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe associated
with
n
δF (cevI )
o∞
v=1
is negative and divergent.
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To prove our result we still need to show that there are economies such that, in
a neighborhood of δ, ∂S(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF ≥ ε, for some ε > 0. In the proof of Proposition 4,
we have defined the expression ∆Se(δF ), governing the sign of ∂S(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF . It is easy
to check that, given δF , ∆Se(δF ) is strictly positive for β close enough to 1. Pick a
value of β, β, such that, at δ, ∂S(.)
∂?δ > ε, for some ε > 0. By continuity,
∂S(.)
∂?δ > ε at
each δ close enough to δ. Change the sequence {cevI }∞v=1 to neutralize the change in
δF (cevI ) due to the new value of β. For the economy so constructed, for some c
e
I , it
must be ∂S(.)∂τe < 0 and arbitrarily large in absolute value, as claimed.
6. APPENDIX 1
A1: Equilibrium in the economy with frictions
We start with an arbitrary threshold bδ. The first order conditions (FOCs in the
sequel) of problem
¡
ΠFs
¢
imply that
ksj (EΩsI(?δ)
(hsαi ) , ξ) =
"
(1− β) (1− α)AsEΩsI(?δ) (h
sα
i )
µ (1− ζs)
# 1
α
(A1)
The FOCs of optimization problem
¡
UFs
¢
imply that
hsi
³
EΩsJ(?δ)
¡
ks1−αj
¢
, ξ
´
=
h
δiαβ (1 + τ
s)AsEΩsJ(?δ)
¡
ks1−αj
¢i 11−α+Γ
. (A2)
Given that firms in sector s are, ex-ante, identical, ksj (.) = k
s(.), and EΩsJ(?δ)
(ksj (.)
1−α) =
ks(.)1−α. Then, solving (A1) and (A2), we obtain
KFs(bδ, ξ) = ∙ (1− α) (1− β)
µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´¸ 1−α+ΓαΓ
(A3)
× ((1 + τ s)αβ) 1Γ As 1+ΓαΓ ,
and
HFs
³
δi,bδ, ξ´ = ∙(1− α) (1− β)µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γi ´
¸ 1−α
αΓ
(A4)
×δ
1
1−α+Γ
i ((1 + τ
s)αβ)
1
Γ As
1
αΓ .
Using these function, agent i’s utility, if active in sector s, is
V Fsi
³
δi,bδ, ξ´ ≡ Usi (HFs(δi,bδ, ξ),KFs(bδ, ξ)) = − (csI +∆csI + T ) (A5)
+
∙
(1− α) (1− β)
µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´¸ (1+Γ)(1−α)αΓ
×δ
a
1−α+Γ
i β
1+Γ
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ [(1 + τ s)α]
1
Γ
1 + Γ− (1 + τs)α
1 + Γ
.
Similarly, given an arbitrary bδ, firm j (ex-post) surplus, if active in sector s and
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matched with worker i, is
ΠFsj
³
δi,bδ, ξ´ = (1− β)As 1+ΓαΓ ((1 + τs)αβ) 1Γ ³δ α1−α+Γi − (1− α)EΩsI(?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γ´´
×
µ
(1− α) (1− β)
µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´¶ (1+Γ)(1−α)αΓ
. (A6)
Its expected value is
EΩsI(?δ)
³
ΠFsj
³
δi,bδ, ξ´´ = ∙ (1− α) (1− β)µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γi ´
¸ 1−α+Γ
αΓ
(A7)
×µ (1− ζ
s) a ((1 + τ s)αβ)
1
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ
(1− α) .
Proof of Proposition 1. Pick the partition ΩPI
³bδ´ induced by any arbitrarybδ. Assume that there is an agent i0 such that δi0 = bδ at bδ solving ³f ³bδ, ξ´− aceI´ =
0. It is easy to check that V Fei
³
δi,bδ, ξ = 0´ − V Fnei ³δi,bδ, ξ = 0´ ≥ 0 if and only
if δi ≥ bδ. Hence, each equilibrium partition ΩPI ³δF´ such that ΩsI ³δF´ 6= ∅, each
s, satisfies ΩeI
³
δF
´
=
n
i ∈ ΩI |δi ≥ δF
o
, where δF is the (unique) threshold value
defining the partition.
Let γ ≡ 1+Γ1−α+Γ . By direct computation, for each threshold bδ,
EΩeI(?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´
=
1
γ
1− bδγ
1− bδ and EΩneI (?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´
=
bδγ−1
γ
.
Evidently, both functions are continuous at each bδ ∈ (0, 1). Given that they are con-
ditional expectations of a strictly increasing function, both are strictly increasing inbδ. Clearly, f ³bδ, ξ = 0´ is continuous at each bδ ∈ (0, 1). Given that EΩsI(?δ) ³δγ−1i ´ ,
each s, is bounded, lim
?δ→0
f
³bδ, ξ = 0´ = 0. Given that lim
?δ→1
1−?δγ
1−?δ =
∂(?δγ)
∂?δ |?δ=1 = γ,
lim
?δ→1
f
³bδ, ξ = 0´ = ³γAe 1+ΓαΓ −Ane 1+ΓαΓ ´ (1− α+ Γ) ≡ _C > 0.
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, for each ceI such that ac
e
I ∈
³
0,
_
C
´
, there
is an interior equilibrium, with threshold δF given by the solution to F (δF , ξ =
0, ceI) = 0.
Evidently, ∂F (.)∂∆ceI
= −a < 0, and, by direct computation,
∂f(.)
∂τ s
|ξ=0 = δFγ−1
µ
AsEΩsI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´(1−α)¶ 1+ΓαΓ (1 + Γ) (1− α)
Γ
(−1)ϕ(s) > 0,
with ϕ(e) = 2 and ϕ(ne) = 1, so that ∂f(.)∂τe |ξ=0 > 0 and ∂f(.)∂τne |ξ=0 < 0. Unfortu-
nately, the sign of ∂f(.)
∂?δ |ξ=0 depends upon the specific parameters of the economy.
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As established in Example A1 below, there are economies where ∂f(.)
∂?δ |ξ=0,?δ=δ is pos-
itive at some δ, negative at some other δ. By choosing appropriately the parameter
ceI , we can construct economies with δ
F = δ, for each δ ∈ (0, 1) . This shows that
there are economies with ∂f(.)
∂?δ |ξ=0,?δ=δF > 0, and others with
∂f(.)
∂?δ |ξ=0,?δ=δF < 0.
By direct computation, at ξ = 0,
∂f(.)
∂bδ = (γ − 1) 1bδ f
³bδ´+ (1− α+ Γ) (1− α) (1 + Γ)
αΓ
bδγ−1bδ
×[Ae 1+ΓαΓ EΩeI(?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
ηeα
³bδ´
−Ane
1+Γ
αΓ EΩneI (?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
ηneα
³bδ´],
where ηsα
³bδ´ is the elasticity of EΩsI(?δ) ³δγ−1i ´ with respect to bδ. By direct computa-
tion, ηneα
³bδ´ = (γ − 1) , while ηeα ³bδ´ = −γ?δγ(1−?δ)+?δ(1−?δγ)(1−?δ)(1−?δγ) .With a straightforward
manipulation, we obtain that
Γbδ Γ−1Γ
1− α+ Γ
∙
γ(1−α)
Ane
¸ 1+Γ
αΓ ∂f(.)
∂bδ
=
⎛
⎜⎝ A
e
Ane
⎛
⎝ 1− bδγ³
1− bδ´bδγ−1
⎞
⎠
(1−α)⎞
⎟⎠
1+Γ
αΓ µ
(1− α) (1 + Γ)
α
ηeα
³bδ´+ Γ (γ − 1)¶− 1,
If ηeα
³bδ´ ≥ 0 at each bδ ∈ (0, 1) , and 1−?δγ
(1−?δ)?δγ−1
is bounded away from zero, the right
hand side of the eq. above is always positive, for A
e
Ane suﬃciently large. Therefore,
for Ae large enough, ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0 at each
bδ and, in particular, at each equilibrium
threshold. Evidently, if ∂F (.)
∂?δ
³
= ∂f(.)
∂?δ
´
> 0 at each solution to F (bδ, ξ, ceI) = 0, the
solution must be unique. Moreover, by the implicit function theorem, ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0
at each equilibrium implies that δF (.) satisfies ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe |ξ=0 < 0, ∂δ
F (.)
∂τne |ξ=0 > 0,
∂δF(.)
∂∆ceI
|ξ=0 > 0, ∂δF(.)∂Ae |ξ=0 < 0 and ∂δ
F (.)
∂Ane |ξ=0 > 0, as claimed.
Hence, to conclude, we need two additional results (we omit the index "b" to
simplify notation):
Fact 1. ηeα (δ) ≥ 0, at each δ ∈ (0, 1) .
By direct computation, ηeα (0) = 0 and η
e
α (1) =
γ−1
2 > 0. Hence, either there
is δ ∈ (0, 1) such that ηeα
¡
δ
¢
= 0 or ηeα (δ) > 0 for each δ ∈ (0, 1) , as claimed.
Consider the numerator of ηeα (δ), call it g (δ) ,
g (δ) = −γδγ (1− δ) + δ (1− δγ) .
Given that the denominator is strictly positive for each δ ∈ (0, 1) , ηe (δ) ≤ 0 if
and only if g(δ) ≤ 0. Clearly, g (0) = g(1) = 0. Given that
∂g (.)
∂δ
=
¡
1− γ2δγ−1 +
¡
γ2 − 1
¢
δγ
¢
,
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∂g(.)
∂δ |δ=0 > 0 and ∂g(.)∂δ |δ=1 = 0. Moreover,
∂2g (.)
∂δ2
|δ=1 = γ
¡
γ2 − 1
¢
δγ−1 − γ2 (γ − 1) δγ−2 = γ (γ − 1) > 0,
so that δ = 1 is a local minimum of g (δ) . Hence, if there is a eδ ∈ (0, 1) such that
g
³eδ´ = 0, there must also be a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that g ¡δ¢ = 0 and ∂g(.)∂δ |δ=δ >
0. Given that, by assumption, δ ∈ (0, 1) , δ 6= 0, and, therefore, g(δ)
δ
= 0, andµ
∂g(.)
∂δ |δ=δ −
g(δ)
δ
¶
> 0. However,
0 <
∂g (.)
∂δ
|δ=δ −
g
¡
δ
¢
δ
= −γ2δγ−1 +
¡
γ2 − 1
¢
δ
γ
+ γδ
γ−1 ¡
1− δ
¢
+ δ
γ
=
¡
γ − γ2
¢ ¡
1− δ
¢
δ
γ−1
< 0,
because γ > 1. A contradiction. Hence, g(δ) > 0 and, therefore, ηeα (δ) > 0, at each
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Fact 2. Let G (δ) ≡
³
1−δγ
1−δ
δ
δγ
´
. Then, G (δ) > γ > 1, for each δ ∈ (0, 1) .
The result is quite obvious from the geometrical viewpoint. Alternatively, ob-
serve that lim
δ→0
G (δ) = +∞ and lim
δ→1
G (δ) = γ. Hence, to establish the Fact, it
suﬃces to show that ∂G(δ)∂δ < 0 at each δ ∈ (0, 1) . By direct computation,
∂G (δ)
∂δ
|δ=?δ =
γ³
1− bδ´bδγ
Ã
1
γ
1− bδγ
1− bδ − 1
!
=
γ³
1− bδ´bδγ
³
EΩeI(?δ)
¡
δγ−1
¢
− 1
´
< 0.
EXAMPLE A1. We show that there are economies such that ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF < 0.
Fix ξ = 0. Let α = 12 , Γ = 10, A
ne = 1, and Ae = 11/10. By direct computation,
f
³bδ´ = 10.5µ105
110
¶ 11
10
⎡
⎢⎣bδ 121
⎛
⎝11
10
Ã
1− bδ
1− bδ
! 1
2
⎞
⎠
11
5
− bδ 110
⎤
⎥⎦ .
∂f(?δ)
∂?δ is strictly positive for
bδ suﬃciently small, and negative for all bδ larger than
some critical value δ. For instance, one can check that
∂f(?δ)
∂?δ |?δ= 12 < 0, while½
∂f(?δ)
∂?δ |?δ
¾∞
v=0
with bδv → 0 is unbounded above. Clearly, choosing appropriately
ceI , we can construct an economy with δ
F = 12 , i.e., such that
∂f(?δ)
∂?δ |?δ=δF < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Set ζs = 0. Let B ≡
h
(1−α)(1−β)
µ
i 1−α
αΓ
(αβ)
1
Γ and
γ = 1+Γ1−α+Γ . Using (A3) and (A4), the equilibrium values of the relevant variables
are
EΩsI(δF )
³
HFs
³
δi, δ
F (φ) , φ
´´
= (1 + τ s)
1
Γ BEΩsI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´ 1−α
αΓ
EΩsI(δF )
µ
δ
1
1−α+Γ
i
¶
As
1
αΓ ,
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EΩsI(δF )
³
ws(δi, δ
F (φ) , φ)
´
= βB(1+Γ)EΩsI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´ 1
(γ−1)Γ
(1 + τ s)
1
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ ,
σws
³
δi, δ
F (φ) , φ
´
=
Ã
βB(1+Γ)EΩsI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
(1 + τ s)
1
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ
!
×
r
EΩsI(δF )
³
δ2γ−2i
´
−EΩsI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´2
,
and
WP
³
δi, δ
F (φ) , φ
´
=
µ
1 + τe
1 + τne
¶ 1
Γ Ae
1+Γ
αΓ
Ane
1+Γ
αΓ
⎛
⎝ 1− δ
Fγ³
1− δF
´
δFγ−1
⎞
⎠
(1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
.
Notice that the wage premium is i−invariant, as claimed in the text. Bear in mind
that, by assumption, ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0, so that
∂δF (.)
∂τe < 0,
∂δF (.)
∂τne > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
> 0,
∂δF (.)
∂Ane > 0, and
∂δF (.)
∂Ae < 0.
Let ηs1
³
δF
´
be the elasticity with respect to δF of EΩsI(δF )
µ
δ
1
1−α+Γ
i
¶
, and
ηs2α
³
δF
´
the one of EΩsI(δF )
³
δ2γ−2i
´
. By direct computation, ηne2α
³
δF
´
= 2 (γ − 1),
while ηne1
³
δF
´
= 11−α+Γ . By Fact 1 above, η
e
α
³
δF
´
> 0. A similar argument es-
tablishes that ηe1
³
δF
´
> 0 and ηs2α
³
δF
´
> 0.
In the sequel we use the generic expression
∂EΩsI(δ
F )(H
Fs(δi,δF ,φ))
∂φ0 to denote the
derivative of EΩsI(δF )
¡
HFs (.)
¢
with respect to one of the parameters of the vector
φ, keeping δF fixed. Similarly, for the other functions and for ∂δ
F (φ)
∂φ0 .
Consider first average human capital. At ξ = 0, by direct computation,
∂EΩsI(δF )
¡
HFs (.)
¢
∂φ0
=
∂EΩsI(δF )
¡
HFs (.)
¢
∂φ0
+
EΩsI(δF )
¡
HFs (.)
¢
δF (.)
µ
1− α
αΓ
ηsα
³
δF
´
+ ηs1
³
δF
´¶ ∂δF (φ)
∂φ0
.
For wages,
∂EΩsI(δF )
(ws(.))
∂φ0
=
∂EΩsI(δF )
(ws(.))
∂φ0
+
EΩsI(δF )
(ws(.))
(γ − 1)Γ η
s
α
³
δF
´ ∂δF (φ)
∂φ0
.
For the wage premium,
∂WP (.)
∂φ0
=
∂WP (.)
∂φ0
+
∂WP (.)
∂δF
∂δF (φ)
∂φ0
,
where, by Fact 2 above,
∂WP (.)
∂δF
=
WP (.) γ
h
EΩeI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´
− 1
i
³
1− δF
´
δFγ
< 0,
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for each δ ∈ (0, 1) . Finally, consider the standard deviations of wages in sector ne.
By direct computation,
∂σne(.)
∂φ0
=
∂σne(δF , φ)
∂φ0
+
∂δF (.)
∂φ0
1
2
σne(.)
δF (φ)r
EΩneI (δF )
³
δ2γ−2i
´
−EΩneI (δF )
³
δγ−1i
´2
[
µ
2
(1 + Γ) (1− α)
αΓ
ηneα
³
δF
´
+ ηne2α
³
δF
´¶
EΩneI (δF )
³
δ2γ−2i
´
−2EΩneI (δF )
³
δγ−1i
´2µ(1 + Γ) (1− α)
αΓ
+ 1
¶
ηneα
³
δF
´
]
Taking into account the values of ηne2α
³
δF
´
and ηneα
³
δF
´
, the term in square
brackets is equal to
2
Γ
∙
EΩneI (δF )
³
δ2γ−2i
´
−EΩneI (δF )
³
δγ−1i
´2¸
> 0.
The Proposition follows immediately.
A2: Ineﬃciency properties of the economy with frictions
The optimal choice ksj is clearly j−invariant and, by assumption, ν
³
ΩsI
³bδ´´
= ν
³
ΩsJ
³bδ´´ . Hence, the planner’ s objective function can be rewritten as
P
³
hsi , k
s,bδ´ ≡ X
s
Z
ΩsI(?δ)
Ã
βAshsαi k
s(1−α) − 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
!
di− csIν
³
ΩsI
³bδ´´
+
X
s
⎛
⎝(1− β)As
R
ΩsI(?δ)
hsαi di
ν
³
ΩsI
³bδ´´ ks(1−α) − µks
⎞
⎠ ν
³
ΩsJ
³bδ´´
=
X
s
Z
ΩsI(?δ)
Ã
Ashsαi k
s(1−α) − 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
!
di
− (csI + µks) ν
³
ΩsI
³bδ´´ .
Its optimization problem is
max
(hsi ,ks,?δ)
P
³
hsi , k
s,bδ´ . (P )
It is convenient to decompose (P ) into three problems. First, given an arbitrary
value bδ, we determine the maps ³HCOs ³δi,bδ´ ,KCOs ³bδ´´ solving, for each s, the
optimization problem
max
(hsi ,ks)
P s?δ (h
s
i , k
s) ≡
Z
ΩsI(?δ)
"
Ashsαi k
s(1−α) − 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
#
di (P sδ∗)
− (csI + µks) ν
³
ΩsI
³bδ´´ .
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Next, given the value functions P s(bδ) of the two problems ³P s?δ ´ , s = e, ne, we
recast problem (P ) as
max
?δ
P (bδ) ≡ P e(bδ) + Pne(bδ), (P )
finding the optimal value of bδ, δCO.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given that optimization problem
³
P s?δ
´
is concave,
each s, its solution is completely characterized by the FOCs:
i.
∂P s?δ (h
s
i ,k
s)
∂hi
= αAsks(1−α)hs(α−1)i − 1δih
sΓ
i = 0,
ii.
∂P s?δ (h
s
i ,k
s)
∂k = (1− α)Asks(−α)
R
ΩsI(?δ)
hsαi di− µ
R
ΩsI(?δ)
di = 0,
which imply
a. KCOs
³bδ´ = As 1+ΓΓα α 1Γ ³1−αµ EΩsI ³δ α1−α+Γi ´´ 1−α+ΓαΓ ,
b. HCOs
³
δi,bδ´ = δ 11−α+Γi α 1ΓAs 1αΓ ³1−αµ EΩsI ³δ α1−α+Γi ´´ 1−ααΓ .
Comparing a−b to (A3)−(A4),KCOs
³bδ´ > KFs(bδ) andHCOs ³δi,bδ´ > HFs ³δi,bδ´ ,
for each bδ, δi and s. Therefore, equilibria are always characterized by underinvest-
ment in physical capital and in the eﬀort in education.
Demand and supply functions are clearly well-defined and continuous at each bδ ∈
(0, 1) and P s(bδ) has the same properties. Hence, problem ¡P¢ has a solution, either
internal or at one of the boundary points, and, therefore, CO allocations exist.
Compare a market allocation and any CO allocation. If they have the same
threshold value bδ, KCOs ³bδ´ 6= KFs(bδ) and the market allocation is not CO. Oth-
erwise, the threshold values are diﬀerent, and constrained ineﬃciency follows im-
mediately.
EXAMPLE A2. Using γ = 1+Γ1−α+Γ ,
1
b ≡ α
1
Γ
³
1−α
µ
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
, andKCOs
³bδ´
HCOs
³
δi,bδ´ , we can rewrite the objective function of problem ¡P¢ as
P (bδ) =X
s
αΓ
1 + Γ
v
³
ΩsI(bδ)´As 1+ΓΓα EΩsI(?δ) ³δγ−1i ´ 1−α+ΓαΓ − v ³ΩeI(bδ)´ bceI ,
and, from the (necessary) FOC,
−γ ∂P (
bδ)
∂bδ = bδAe 1+ΓΓα EΩeI(?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
⎛
⎝1− (1− α)
EΩeI(?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´
EΩneI (?δ)
³
δγ−1i
´
⎞
⎠
−αbδAne 1+ΓΓα EΩneI (?δ) ³δγ−1i ´ 1−α+ΓαΓ − γbceI = 0.
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Hence, δCO is either the solution to γ ∂P (
?δ)
∂?δ = 0, or δ
CO ∈ {0, 1} , while δF is the
solution toÃ
δFγ−1Ae
1+Γ
αΓ EΩeI(δF )
³
δγ−1i
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ − δFγ−1Ane
1+Γ
αΓ EΩneI (δF )
³
δγ−1i
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
!
×
³
β (1− β)
1−α
α
´ 1+Γ
Γ − γbceI = 0.
Let Γ = µ = Ane = 1, while α = β = 12 , and A
e = 2. Let
MF (bδ) ≡ 24Ã3
4
1− bδ
1− bδ
!2Ãbδ − 1
2
1− bδ
1− bδ
!
− 1
2
bδµ3
4
bδ¶2
and
MCO(bδ) ≡ 1
16
⎛
⎝bδ24Ã3
4
1− bδ
1− bδ
!2
− bδµ3
4
bδ¶2
⎞
⎠ .
Then, the equilibrium conditions above can be rewritten as MCO(bδ) − 323 ceI =
0, for δCO, and MF (bδ)− 323 ceI = 0, for δF .
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE
Figure 2 reports the graphs of MCO(bδ) (the dotted line) and MF (bδ). Notice
that, in the relevant range, MCO(bδ) is concave, so that MCO(bδ) − 323 ceI = 0 is
also a suﬃcient condition for the optimal solution δCO. For bδ suﬃciently small,
MF (bδ) > MCO(bδ), while for bδ suﬃciently large MCO(bδ) > MF (bδ). Hence, for ceI
suﬃciently small δF < δCO, while the opposite occurs for ceI suﬃciently large.
Proof of Corollary 1. Obviously, there are many diﬀerent tax-subsidy schemes
implementing the CO allocation. We will focus the analysis on linear subsidies on
labor income and investments in physical capital, and on fixed fees and lump-sum
taxes. Fix ζ
e
= ζ
ne
= β and τe = τne = 1−ββ . It is easy to check that, given any
threshold value bδ, the FOCs of the individual optimization problem in the actual
economy imply that the FOCs of the (constrained) planner’s optimization problem
are satisfied. Let δF (ξ) be the market threshold value associated with ξ.
By direct computation, at the CO allocation, expected profits are zero in both
sectors. Hence, firms are indiﬀerent among sectors. Therefore, at each optimal
solution bδ ∈ (0, 1) , the FOCs of optimization problem (P ) are simply given by
−
h
Uei (H
COe
³
δi = bδ,bδ´ ,KCOe ³bδ´)− Unei (HCOne ³δi = bδ,bδ´ ,KCOne ³bδ´)− ceIi
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(?δ)
∂Usi (H
COs
³
δi = bδ,bδ´ ,KCOs ³bδ´)
∂bδ = 0.
Set
∆c
e
I =
X
s
Z
ΩsI(?δ)
∂Usi (H
COs
³
δi = bδ,bδ´ ,KCOs ³bδ´)
∂bδ .
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Then, given education fees equal to
³
ceI +∆c
e
I
´
, δF (ξ) = δCO and the equilib-
rium level of total surplus coincides with its CO level. Finally, redistribute the total
net revenues (or costs) of the fee-subsidy scheme across workers using i-invariant
lump-sum taxes, so to balance the budget.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the properties of the two sets ΩsI
³
δF
´
and
ΩsJ
³
δF
´
, we can rewrite S(ξ) as
S(δF (ξ) , ξ) ≡
X
s
ÃZ
ΩsI(δF (ξ))
V Fs(δi, δ
F , ξ)di+
Z
ΩsJ(δF (ξ))
EΩsI(δF (ξ))
³
ΠFs
³
δF , ξ
´´
dj
!
.
Remember that the net sum of taxes and subsidies is zero. Therefore,
∂S(.)
∂τ s
=
µ
∂S(.)
∂δF
¶
∂δF (ξ)
∂τs
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δF (.))
∂V Fs(δi, δ
F , ξ)
∂τs
di
+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δF (ξ))
∂EΩsI(δF (ξ))
³
ΠFs
³
δF , ξ
´´
∂τs
dj
∂S(.)
∂∆ceI
=
∂S(.)
∂δF
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
.
From eqs (A5) and (A7), the last two terms of ∂S(.)∂τs are positive. By direct compu-
tation,
∂S(.)
∂δF
= −
h
V Fei
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´
− V Fnei
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´i
−
h
ΠFej
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´
−ΠFnej
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´i
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δF )
∂V Fsi (.)
∂δF
di+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δF )
∂EΩsI(δF )
¡
ΠFsj (.)
¢
∂δF
dj.
By definition of δF , the first term in square brackets is zero. We have already es-
tablished (see eqs. (7)) that the last four terms are positive. ΠFnej
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´
is also positive, because
ΠFnej
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´
≥ EΩneI (δF )
¡
ΠFnej (.)
¢
≥ 0.
Hence, a suﬃcient condition for ∂S(.)∂δF > 0 is
0 ≤ ∆Se ≡
Z
ΩeI(δF )
∂V Fei (.)
∂δF
di+
Z
ΩeJ(δF )
∂EΩeI(δF )
¡
ΠFsj (.)
¢
∂δF
dj
−ΠFej
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´
.
Define
Be =
⎡
⎣ 1
γ
Ae
1+Γ
αΓ (αβ)
1
Γ
µ
(1− α) (1− β)
µ
EΩeI(δF )
¡
δγ−1
¢¶ (1+Γ)(1−α)αΓ ⎤⎦ .
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Using γ ≡ 1+Γ1−α+Γ , and (A6), the ex-post profits of the firm matched with worker i
such that δi = δ
F are
ΠFej
³
δi = δ
F , δF , ξ
´
= (1− β)
Ã
γδFγ−1i − (1− α)
Ã
1− δFγ
1− δF
!!
×Be.
Using (A5) and (A7) ,Z
ΩeI(δF )
∂V Fei (.)
∂δF
di = Be
(1 + Γ) (1− α)
γαΓ
β
Ã
1− δFγ
1− δF
− γδFγ−1
!
and Z
ΩeJ(δF )
∂EΩej(δF )
¡
ΠFej (.)
¢
∂δF
dj =
1− α
Γ
Be (1− β)
Ã
1− δFγ
1− δF
− γδFγ−1
!
.
Hence,
Γ∆Se
(1 + Γ) δFγ−1Be
=
⎡
⎣β (1− α)
γα
⎛
⎝ 1− δ
Fγ³
1− δF
´
δFγ−1
− γ
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
+(1− β)
⎡
⎣(1− α) 1− δ
Fγ³
1− δF
´
δFγ−1
− 1
⎤
⎦ > 0.
The first term in square brackets is strictly positive (because, as shown in Fact 2
above, 1−δ
Fγ
(1−δF )δFγ−1
is bounded below by γ). By assumption, the second term is
positive. Notice that the inequality is always satisfied for β large enough.
When ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
> 0 and ∂δ
F (.)
∂τne > 0, so that
∂S(ξ)
∂τne > 0 and
∂S(ξ)
∂∆ceI
> 0.
It follows that a subsidy to labor income in sector ne, and/or an increase in the
fixed cost of education ceI , increases the expected total surplus .
On the other hand, ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe < 0 and, therefore, under the maintained assump-
tions, the sign of ∂S(.)∂τe is undefined.
7. APPENDIX 2: COMPETITIVE SPOT LABOR MARKET
There is a continuum of separated islands, denoted by c ∈ (0, 1). On each is-
land there is an interval (0, 1) of identical workers and firms. Firms (denoted by a
pair (j, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)) are identical across islands. Workers (denoted by a pair
(i, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)) are identical within an island (i.e., with respect to the index
c), but heterogeneous across islands, because of the parameter δi, whose realization
in a given island is private information of the workers21 . First, firms and workers
choose the type and amount of their investments. Next, investments are mutu-
ally observable, (island specific) labor markets open and clear at the competitive
21 In the sequel we implicitly assume that the realization of EΩsc(?δ)
?
δ
α
1+Γ−α
i
?
coincides with
its theoretical value. Using appropriate assumptions on the random variables δi, this can be
guaranteed.
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wage. Given that, ex-ante, the realization δi is not observable, firms choose their
investments taking into account the (conditional on bδ) distribution of the human
capital of the workers. Preferences and production functions are as above. Given
that firms are identical, they all have the same optimal level of investments in each
sector.
Each worker chooses her behavior solving: given the equilibriummaps (wsi (δi) , sc(j))
and the equilibrium threshold value δ,
choose
n
sic, h
s
ic
o
∈ argmax
s
(
max
h
s
ic
EΩsc(δ) (U
s
ic (C
s
ic, h
s
ic)) s.to C
s
ic = w
s
i (δi)h
s
ic − csI
)
.
(U2)
where sic ∈ {e, ne} denotes her choice of the optimal sector.
Given the equilibrium maps (wi (δi) , sc(i)) and the equilibrium threshold value
δ, each firm solves optimization problem
choose
n
sjc,
³
k
s
jc, h
s
jc
´o
∈ argmax
s
(
max
(ksjc,h
s
jc)
EΩsc(δ)
³
Ashsαjc k
s(1−α)
jc − wsi (δi)hsαjc − µksjc
´)
,
(Π2)
with sjc ∈ {e, ne} .
Definition 2. A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of maps (wnei (δi) , w
e
i (δi)) ,
a threshold value δ, and maps {sc(i), hsc (i)} and {sc(j), ksc (j), hsc(j)} such that
i. EΩe(δ)
³
Ueic
³
C
e
ic, h
e
ic
´´
−EΩne(δ)
³
Uneic
³
C
ne
ic , h
ne
ic
´´
≥ 0 if and only if δi ≥ δ,
ii. for each (i, c) , (sc (i) , hsc (i)) solves (U2),
iii. for each (j, c) , {sc (j) , (ksc (j) , hsc (j))} solves (Π2) ,
iv. for each c,
R
(0,1) h
s
c(i)di =
R
(0,1) h
s
c(j)dj, for each j.
We start solving for the ex-post competitive equilibrium, contingent on the
aggregate investments in physical capital. A straightforward computation shows
that the equilibrium wage map is defined by
ws
³
δi,K
s
j
´
=
³
αAsK
s
j
(1−α)
´ Γ
1−α+Γ
δ
1−α
1−α+Γ
i
.
Moreover, given an arbitrary threshold value bδ, ex-ante, expected profits of a firm
active in sector s are given by
EΩs(?δ) (Πjc) = (αA
s)
1
1−α
µ
1− α
α
¶
EΩs(?δ)
⎛
⎜⎝ 1
ws
³
δi,K
s
j
´ 1
1−α
⎞
⎟⎠ kjc − µkjc.
Hence, the zero expected profit condition imposes
(αAs)
1
1−α
µ
1− α
µα
¶
EΩs(?δ)
⎛
⎜⎝ 1
ws
³
δi,K
s
j
´ 1
1−α
⎞
⎟⎠ = 1.
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Replacing into this condition ws
³
δi,K
s
j
´
, and taking into account that K
s
j is
j−invariant, we get
K
s
j =
µ
1− α
µα
¶ 1−α+Γ
αΓ
(αAs)
1+Γ
αΓ EΩs(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´ 1−α+Γ
αΓ
.
Replacing into ws
³
δi,K
s
j
´
, we obtain the map
ws
³
δi,bδ´ = (αAs)
1
α
³
1−α
µα
´ 1−α
α
EΩs(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´ 1−α
α
δ
1−α
1−α+Γ
i
.
Finally, given bδ, the value of the indirect utility function (if s) is
V si
³
δi,bδ´ =
⎛
⎝ Γ
1 + Γ
µ
1− α
µα
¶ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
α
1+Γ
αΓ
⎞
⎠ δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
×As 1+ΓαΓ EΩs(?δ)
³
δ
α
1−α+Γ
i
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ − csI .
The map defining the equilibrium threshold is then
0 = bδ α1−α+Γ µAeEΩeI(?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γi ´(1−α)
¶ (1+Γ)
αΓ
(10)
−bδ α1−α+Γ µAneEΩneI (?δ) ³δ α1−α+Γi ´(1−α)
¶ (1+Γ)
αΓ
− bceI ,
with b =
Ã
1+Γ
Γ( 1−αµα )
(1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ α
1+Γ
αΓ
!
.
Modulo a multiplicative term, this expression is identical to eq. (2) in the text.
Evidently, the qualitative properties of equilibria are identical in the two classes of
economies. There is, however, an important diﬀerence with respect to eﬃciency.
According to the definition of CO introduced above, the supply of human and
physical capital is CO, contingent on the threshold value, i.e., if δF = δCO the
market equilibrium would be CO. However, it is easy too see that it is always
δF < δCO, i.e., there is always overinvestment in the education level. Indeed, given
that expected profits are always zero, the planner objective function reduces to
P (bδ) = Z ?δ
0
V nei
³
δi,bδ´ dδi + Z 1
?δ
V ei
³
δi,bδ´ dδi,
with FOC
∂P (bδ)
∂bδ = −
h
V ei
³
δi = bδ,bδ´− V nei ³δi = bδ,bδ´i
+
Z ?δ
0
∂V nei
³
δi,bδ´
∂bδ dδi +
Z 1
?δ
∂V ei
³
δi,bδ´
∂bδ dδi.
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The last two terms are always strictly positive. Hence, ∂P (
?δ)
∂?δ = 0 (a necessary
condition for an interior optimum) requiresh
V ei
³
δi = bδ,bδ´− V nei ³δi = bδ,bδ´i > 0.
Therefore, if ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0 (i.e., if
Ae
Ane is large enough), we always have overinvestment
in education level.
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